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On-Chain Permissions & Governance Scope
Control of the Lightchain mainnet is split in two. TheTreasury is owned by a TimelockController that the community drives through LightChainGovernor: treasury funds move only through a proposal that the community has voted on and that has cleared the 48-hour Timelock. The protocol contracts (AIConfig, JobRegistry, WorkerRegistry, SessionManager, FeePool and ReputationRegistry) are owned by the protocol Safe 0xf737…8c57 (3 of 5 signers), as approved by a vote of the earlier Ethereum-based Beta DAO, so the protocol can be stopped or corrected quickly if something goes wrong. See Who controls the protocol contracts.
This page enumerates every privileged surface area on mainnet, who can touch it, and — equally important — what is structurally outside the team's control.
Governance stack at a glance
Voting power is denominated in native LCAI held at the proposal snapshot block. No wrapper is needed on Lightchain itself —NativeVotes exposes the IVotes interface directly on top of native LCAI balances.
For the configured parameters (proposal threshold, voting delay, voting period, quorum, timelock delay), see Governance & Protocol Parameters.
Timelock roles
TheTimelockController owns the Treasury. Access to it is gated by four OpenZeppelin roles:
The practical consequence is that the only way to move Treasury funds is:
- A proposer with ≥
PROPOSAL_THRESHOLDLCAI (140,000 LCAI) creates a proposal. - Voting delay (~24 h) elapses; the snapshot block is reached.
- Voting period (~5 days: 216,000 blocks at 2 s) elapses; the proposal must reach quorum (3% of total voting power) with a majority for.
- The Governor queues the operation against the Timelock.
- 48 hours pass.
- Anyone executes the operation.
onlyGovernance).
Who controls the protocol contracts
AIConfig, JobRegistry, WorkerRegistry, SessionManager, FeePool and ReputationRegistry are owned by the protocol Safe 0xf737…8c57 (Safe 1.5.0, 3 of 5 signers; open in Safe), not by the Timelock. The Beta DAO on Ethereum approved this so the protocol can be stopped or corrected quickly if something goes wrong. Ownership moved to the Safe from the deployer EOA 0x8a35E00eff6f3bf125aE5011cc7C603E18B8D616 on 20 October 2026.
Changes to these contracts (model whitelisting, protocol parameters, upgrades) need 3 of the 5 Safe signatures and do not go through a Governor vote. Every change is a public transaction from the Safe that anyone can review on Lightscan. Check the current owner of any contract with owner().
What the owner controls
Every function below is gated byonlyOwner. For WorkerRegistry and AIConfig the owner is the protocol Safe (3 of 5 signatures). For the Treasury the owner is the TimelockController, reached only through the proposal flow described above.
WorkerRegistry — model eligibility and worker stake
Slashing (slash(address, uint256)) is not governance-controlled — it is onlyJobRegistry, called automatically by JobRegistry when an offense is detected. The owner can tune the slashing rates inside AIConfig, but cannot directly slash a worker.
AIConfig — protocol parameters and model registry
Treasury
There is no path to drain the Treasury that bypasses a governance proposal. claimWithdrawal() is open (it's the pull-mechanism fallback for a failed transfer), but it can only retrieve funds that were already approved for the caller by a prior governance action.
Contract upgrades
The protocol contracts and theTreasury are UUPS proxies. The upgrade authorization function _authorizeUpgrade(address) enforces onlyOwner. A protocol contract upgrade needs 3 of the 5 protocol Safe signatures. A Treasury upgrade needs the full proposal → vote → queue → 48 h → execute flow.
What the owner cannot do
Neither the protocol Safe nor a successful proposal can move certain dials, because the limits are enforced in the contracts as immutable bounds or invariants:- Slashing rates cannot exceed
maxSlashBps. It is 5,000 (50%) today, so a call tosetDisputeSlashBps(6000)reverts.maxSlashBpsis a stored value the owner can change withsetMaxSlashBps, up to 10,000. - Fee distribution must sum to 10,000 bps. A proposal that sets a 50/40/5 split (sum = 9,500) reverts.
- Dispute window and resolution timeout have minimum bounds. Setters enforce floor values so a proposal cannot collapse the dispute window to zero.
WorkerRegistry.slashisonlyJobRegistry. Governance has no path to slash a worker directly. Slashing only happens through detected on-chain offenses.
The Guardian role
Admin control of the protocol contracts, including the emergency stop, was approved by a proposal on the earlier Ethereum-based Beta DAO so the protocol can be stopped quickly if something goes wrong. The DAO can vote on a new proposal to reduce or remove this control, and the protocol Safe signers carry out the result. The emergency stop is aGuardian role, assigned by the protocol Safe, that can call pause() on WorkerRegistry, JobRegistry and FeePool. The protocol Safe can also pause directly. While paused, the affected contracts reject:
- New worker registration
- New session creation
- New job submission
- Fee distribution
- Modify any protocol parameter
- Add or remove models
- Move treasury funds
- Upgrade any contract
- Unpause: only the owner (the protocol Safe) can call
unpause(), and it can reassign the Guardian viasetGuardianor retire the role viasunsetGuardian()
sunsetGuardian() is irreversible: once it is called, the Guardian role can never be reassigned.
Model whitelisting and removal
Of all the owner-controlled surfaces above, model lifecycle is the one the team is most often asked about, so it warrants explicit treatment. There are two layered gates a model passes through to be servable on Lightchain. Both are owned by the protocol Safe: any change needs 3 of its 5 signers.Gate 1 — Protocol-wide registration (AIConfig)
CodeSOLIDITY
enabled. disableModel flips the flag back to false without removing the registration (workers still on the eligible set are immediately rejected by JobRegistry when they try to ack a job for that model).
Gate 2 — Per-worker whitelist (WorkerRegistry)
CodeSOLIDITY
What this means in practice
- Adding a new model requires calls to
AIConfig.registerModelandWorkerRegistry.addWhitelistedModel(typically batched in one Safe transaction), signed by 3 of the 5 Safe signers. - Removing a model requires a Safe transaction calling
WorkerRegistry.removeWhitelistedModeland/orAIConfig.disableModel, with the same signatures. - A delisted model can be re-whitelisted later. Delisting is reversible, not permanent.
0xf737…8c57 that anyone can review on Lightscan.
Related pages
- Governance & Protocol Parameters — current values for every parameter referenced here.
- Contract Addresses — canonical addresses for the Governor, Timelock, NativeVotes, and the protocol contracts.
- Ballot — separate guide covering the Ethereum-based LCAI-Ballots wrap/Treasury DAO.
- Model Governance — the product surface for proposing and tracking models.
- Slashing & Rehabilitation — what governance-tunable slashing rates lead to in practice.